Organizer and Chair: Cynthia J. Brokaw, Ohio State University
Patricia Boling, Purdue University
This paper draws on field work conducted in four countries that have
contrasting welfare state regimes, labor markets, and fertility behaviors:
Japan, Germany, France and the United States. Several studies have analyzed
fertility behaviors in different countries in terms of labor market characteristics
and family-friendly policies, generally concluding that countries that
transfer resources to families with children and adopt provisions that allow
mothers to better cope with family and career responsibilities help remove
obstacles to childbearing and increase fertility. But existing theories
of demographic change don’t adequately capture the complicated interaction of factors
that shape people’s decisions to work while raising kids--or to drop
out of the workforce for a time when children are young, or to defer or
forego having children. Attending to countries that contrast along dimensions
of social policy, organization of work, and values related to raising children,
sharing care work, individualism vs. role complementarity, and “good
enough” care for children can help us better understand how women
approach the “kids or career” dilemma. Attending to contrasting
continental welfare states like France and Germany and paradoxical cases
like Japan and the US (the former has adopted pro-family policies with
little effect, the latter has a pared down market based welfare state but
a robust fertility rate) can help us better understand factors such as the
character of the welfare state and its supports, the organization of work,
and cultural and personal values and attitudes that are transforming how
adults feel about having and raising children.
Amiko Nobori, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Japan
This article examines Japan’s Southeast Asian policy in the 1970s,
focusing particularly on Indonesia. During this period, many assumptions
on Japan’s postwar Asian policy within the American Cold War strategy
were questioned. The article illustrates this process from four perspectives:
(1) the relative decline of the American hegemony in Asia; (2) the cooperation
and competition between Japanese and the US interest in Indonesia; (3) the
growing economic nationalism in Indonesia; and (4) the Japanese government’s
perception of a new environment for its relations with Indonesia.
First, this paper analyzes the manner in which Nixon’s
new Asian policy affected the Indonesian perception of Japan. Indonesians expressed
a concern that America would withdraw from Asia and shift some of the responsibilities
of security in this region to Japan.
Second, the article examines Japan’s economic
relations with Indonesia in light of the US-Indonesian relations. Competition
between Japan and the US interest in resources such as oil and natural gas
was increasing over time.
Third, economic nationalism in Indonesia has developed
with the influx of revenue into the state due to the oil price rises, which
strengthened its position vis-à-vis Japan.
Fourth, the article illustrates how the Japanese Foreign Ministry analyzed
the background and causes of anti-Japanese sentiments in Indonesia.
Finally, it argues that Japan’s Southeast Asian
policy in the early 1970s stood at a turning point with the transformation
of the international relations in the Asia-Pacific region, the competitive
dimension of the US-Japanese relations, and the reemergence of economic nationalism
in regional countries.
Devin K. Joshi, University of Washington
This study examines the relative contributions of good governance and economic
growth to advancing human development (especially children’s health and
education) in China & India over the period from 1950 to 2005. Theoretically
I explore how the potential dynamic of a state-led virtuous cycle of human development
(HD) diverges from a growth-led development model. To empirically assess the
impact of good governance I develop a normatively explicit and empirically rigorous “government
effectiveness index” (GEI) to combine macro, meso, and micro dimensions
of state capacity. This includes state leadership priorities (as demonstrated
by public finance allocations and basic infrastructure provisions), general
state administrative capacity (in public resource utilization and efficiency)
and state capacity in the HD sector to advance compulsory elementary education
(CEE) and maternal and child health (MCH). Contrary to neo-liberalism and
other growth-led development explanations, this study found that good governance
and social equality explains more of human development performance than economic
growth. The study is based on completed dissertation research involving 4
field-study trips and extensive interviewing in India and China over the last
two years.
Mika Marumoto, Harvard-Yenching Institute
When and how can external economic engagement have the most impact in inducing
North Korean opening and reform, rather than merely prolonging regime survival?
What sorts of external economic engagement are most likely to engender North
Korea’s transformation to a market economy? The paper investigates North
Korea’s two most significant external economic relationships during the
Kim Jong-il era (1998-2007), with China and South Korea, looking separately
at engagement by actors at four distinct levels -- central government, local
government, enterprises and the grassroots level. Analysis reveals that economic
engagement can have a substantive impact on North Korean economic policy, as
well as on the empirical characteristics of how the North Korean economy functions
in practical terms. But external economic engagement works best in transforming
the North Korean economy when multiple channels of engagement are at work simultaneously,
as demonstrated by China, in order to get past the rigid regime’s dedicated
gatekeepers and enforcers of Communist orthodoxy.
Historical and geopolitical conditions, as well as different national interests
and goals, have produced markedly different engagement patterns by China
and South Korea. Chinese economic engagement at the local government and business
levels, primarily as organized by actors resident in China’s northeast
provinces, has served as an especially potent catalyst in North Korean economic
change. These provinces can also serve as a model for North Korea’s future
economic development. South Korea faces unique limitations that have prevented
it from making its engagement more relevant to North Korea’s economic
market development, or policymaking conducive to a more market-based economy.
If China and South Korea coordinate strategically, however, they should be
able to complement one another in helping to transform the North Korean economy.
No single foreign actor can alone achieve the daunting task to persuading
North Korea to change course.
[Contributed to the Korea Economic Institute of America, Korea’s Economy
2008, (forthcoming 2008)].
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