Organizer: Katherine A. Bowie, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Chair: Paul Hutchcroft, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Michelle A. Miller, National University of Singapore
This paper considers the capacity of democratizing states to resolve their
national identity problems/territorial disputes, focusing on the case study
of Indonesia’s Aceh province. In broad theoretical terms, the paper argues
against Dankwart Rustow’s core hypothesis that democratization requires
prior consensus on national identity. Instead, it supports Linz and Stepan’s
argument that democracy can occur in the absence of a unifying nationalism
if states pursue non-majoritarian policies that grant special rights to aggrieved
minority groups.
In exploring the Indonesian state’s capacity to achieve democratic accommodation
in post-tsunami, post-conflict Aceh, this paper differs from other writings
on this subject by focusing on centre-periphery relations from the perspective
of “the center” (Indonesia’s national command systems and
the elites that govern them). It considers how and why Jakarta was capable
of restoring a high degree of security in Aceh following the signing of an historic
peace agreement between the Indonesian government and Free Aceh Movement
leaders in Helsinki in August 2005, which brought an end to almost three decades
of conflict and granted the Acehnese people a high level of meaningful autonomy
within the Indonesian state. Drawing on personal interviews with Indonesian
government and military leaders, former Free Aceh Movement rebels and Acehnese
civil society representatives and religious leaders, the paper provides new
insights into the political processes and attitudes that led to the signing
of the Helsinki agreement and considers the prospects for sustainable security
and peace in Aceh.
Mathias Diederich, Leiden University
The democratization process in Indonesia started in 1998 and led to the establishment
of many new political parties. A considerable number of them define themselves
as Islamic. Party platforms and by-laws represent their official views and
unfold a fascinating mosaic of different understandings of political Islam in
a young democracy. Using synoptic approaches and referring to Ian Budge’s
spatial theory of party competition, my paper will explore the way three different
Islamic parties (PKB, PKS, and PBB) refer to Western models of democracy and
state while at the same time incorporating traditional Islamic principles adopted
from the Arab world and specifically Indonesian concepts, too.
The results show that the respective images of the so-called “moderate” and “radical” parties
as presented in the media differ from the official platforms in many respects
or are at least remarkably inconsistent over the years, e.g. parties perceived
as being radical do not necessarily emphasize the shari`a and vice-versa.
The programmatic statements will also be assessed in the light of the new
typology on political parties developed by Gunther and Diamond. This assessment
seems to be particularly suitable for the following two reasons: 1. The said
typology takes new specific characteristics into account which are typical for
the ongoing democratic transition in many developing countries, e.g. strong
religious or ethnic orientations. 2. While Gunther and Diamond themselves focus
on the type of party organization, they also emphasize the equal importance
of the programmatic aspects as well as strategy and behavioural norms for an
appropriate classification.
Takeshi Ito, Bard College
Historically, the state has established patrimonial ties with relatively
homogenous local elites and used them to make rural life accessible and identifiable
for the center. While rural life was reorganized chiefly in functional and
territorial terms, the patrimonial ties were preserved as the primary means
of extracting communal resources in the process of state formation. Hence, the
political structure was in many ways characterized by dualism that perpetuated
ambiguous boundaries between state actors and social forces at the expense of
the population. The same logic of state formation can be observed in the current
neoliberal efforts at democratic decentralization in developing countries. For
the sake of bureaucratic efficiency and political stability, donors, international
aid agencies, and local governments alike transfer power and resources to local
institutions—private
bodies, customary authorities, and civil society organizations. In so doing,
however, they reinforce the self-perpetuating structure of dualism put in
place in the political structure during the intensification of state formation
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Drawing on history and political
ethnography in the Priangan highland of West Java, Indonesia, this essay aims
to show how the implementation of democratic decentralization conveniently perches
over the preexisting structure of institutions and ideas, thereby undermining
rather than promoting government accountability and popular participation.
Rusaslina Idrus, Harvard University
The Orang Asli of Peninsular Malaysia are considered wards of the state and
have limited land rights—many communities do not have secure tenure over
their traditional lands. More recently, the Orang Asli have looked to litigation
to assert customary land ownership. In this paper, I examine a landmark case,
Sagong Tasi versus State of Selangor (2002), in which a group of Orang Asli
sued the state over land ownership. While the focus in this lawsuit and other
similar cases is on land rights, I suggest here what are being raised are also
questions of Orang Asli’s place and rights as citizens and an indigenous
community in multi-ethnic, postcolonial Malaysia. In this paper, I explore
how the legal arena is providing a new space for the articulation and negotiation
of these rights.
John H. Barnett, Emporia State University
This paper focuses on the agriculture policies that promoted the land reform
that encouraged more farmers in Vietnam to become economically independent,
and how new land laws promoted a new type of ownership. These policies eventually
gave more authority to the farmers, making them able to use their leases to
obtain credit. As a result of these policies and the decentralization process,
the provinces performed differently in the agricultural sector, making some
better off than others. This was due to provincial leadership, provincial budgets,
and the infrastructure of each province. This paper will be organized into three
parts: Part One discusses the background of the agricultural reforms, Part Two
discusses the land policies that led to giving more authority to the farmers,
and Part Three gives conclusions and recommendations.
From 1982-1986, the Vietnamese Government implemented policies to improve
the agricultural sector in Vietnam. At that time the Vietnamese economy was
in dire straits and the agriculture sector was near failure. This was due to
a result of Rule Four which called for the rapid transition of the farms in
the South to be collectivized. As a result, the farmers essentially resisted
the idea and production almost ceased. Party leaders in Vietnam realized there
was a need for a policy that would give farmers the incentive needed to stimulate
the agricultural sector. The government implemented a policy known as Contract
100, which the government allowed the farmer to sell half of the crops to the
government at a set price, while the other half could be used at the discretion
of the farmer. However, this had a short-term impact and by 1986, the government
realized that there was a need to initiate economic reforms that would further
develop the agricultural sector.
The agriculture reforms during the Doi Moi period (1987-2002) removed Marxist
institutions. These policies, over a period of time, gave more authority to
the provinces. These policies will be discussed in detail and will also include
the political and agricultural events that led to these reforms.
The conclusion discusses the impact of the policies in Part Two, while giving
recommendations to future researchers and policymakers.
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